

*Meeting EC representatives
with
SE Ignalina NPP
Independent Trade Union*

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Topics for discussion



1. **Employee representation on the management board.** *The court issued its final decision on 10 March 2026, yet the situation remains unchanged.*
2. **Social dialogue.** *A merely formal imitation of dialogue. Ongoing interference in the trade union's activities and pressure on the union. Request to recall the Management Board. The collective agreement and the upcoming negotiations.*
3. **Implementation of structural changes in 2026.** *Consultations were terminated almost a year ago. The real consequences include the loss of specialists, injuries, forthcoming delays in projects, and other risks.*
4. **Employee motivation is being set against management motivation.** *Under incentive schemes, employees receive ten times less than managers. Experienced managers and specialists are being replaced by managers from the railway and airline sectors.*
5. **Implementation of the DGR and SMR projects alongside the decommissioning of Ignalina NPP.** *This poses a real threat to projects financed under the Ignalina Program: easier access to state funding results in less attention being paid to specialists and employees working under the Ignalina Program.*

1. Worker Representation on the Board



Supreme Administrative Court decision (10 March 2026) obliges Ministry of Energy to reconsider appointment of workers' representative

Nevertheless: no progress despite final, non-appealable ruling

*During meeting with the Minister of Energy on 20 March, the employees received an unusual response:
"the Ministry is working with the court decision"*



Action taken:

- Meeting with all political forces were conducted in the Seim of LR to present situation
- Legislation was amended

Further steps:

- Bailiff engaged to enforce decision (about month ago) – *still awaiting results*
- New government and Minister of Energy were appointed on 2026-07-14 - *meeting requested*



Conclusion: it reflects a systemic reluctance to involve employees in the management process

2. Social dialogue




Concerns

- Repeated interference by the CEO in the independent *activities of TU, including demands for explanations, justifications and revisions of TU decisions*
- Board (without worker representatives) exceeds mandate, deciding on salaries of all categories



Imitation of Dialogue

- Hired “partners” with no work experience in collaboration with TU are causing delays
- Meetings with the TU are of a formal nature and are mainly held at the request of the Ministry or the EC
- No information is provided—TU obtains it primarily through government agencies and the Seimas
- Issue escalated to Seimas and Office of the President



Collective Agreement

- Current agreement expires in one year - *extension for 1 year is possible*
- Wage system, annual performance evaluation, deviation from normal conditions and so on - *directly affect workers*
- Attempts to reduce additional guarantees



Proposal: recognize the existence of collective agreement as indicator of social dialogue

3.1 Implementation of structural changes in 2026



Main stages:

- Were announced in April 2025 and **the main reason for it was named as EC requirement**
- Consultations with TU terminated in August 2025
- Documents approval with regulator lasts more than 1 year - *TU concerns confirmed*



Changes resemble an imitation of real change:

- Experienced staff dismissed, at the same time, recruitment for the same positions is being announced
- Planned “Nuclear Safety” Department renamed to “Safety and Compliance” (*was reorganized after 2010*)
- The words 'group', 'section', 'department' and 'division' are being removed from organizational unit names
- Regulator issued ~150 comments



Examples:

- ❑ Job descriptions are being simplified, and requirements are being lowered
- ❑ *The external experts’ job evaluation results (Korn Ferry) are being withheld – only corrected is provided*
- ❑ Indirect activities became more important, but no change to main: dismantling, RAW treatment

Risks/consequences: *demotivation, personnel loss, rising costs and project delays, because of decisions that appear to be inconsistent with legal regulations, employees have already approached the TU seeking assistance with court*

Concern: this structural change could lead to the largest voluntary loss of experienced personnel

3.2 Implementation of structural changes in 2026



Next (not official, but under implementation steps):

To reduce by 30% the current stuff – to implement “~~make-or~~buy” strategy without economical benefits
[DS project, when employees from the Slovak are hired]



Examples (Incorrect priorities):

- ❖ Outsourcing protective means decontamination to Denmark **versus**
basic needs (thermal underwear) ignored
- ❖ Outsourcing [Engineering design], [laboratory measurements], etc. **versus**
motivating employees and preparation of replacements
- ❖ Creating information noise to distract from the real issues:
 - Structural changes with no justification and without attention to problems in core activities
 - Despite declarations of cooperation with educational institutions, in practice 40-50% of fitter positions in the dismantling activities remain unfilled

Risks/consequences: demotivation, personnel loss, rising costs and project delays

Question: Does the EC require outsourcing activities without assessing their economic benefits?



2025: dismantling workers received €1,300 bonuses, but 19 managers €13,000 (!!!)

- Disproportionate growth of managers in Vilnius office - *72 employees-managers*
- Lowered competence requirements - *experienced staff leaving off*
- Same situation was at Railway company – *consequences aren't mitigated till now*

Proposals:

- ☐ Worker's (KF19-KF25) and Vilnius office managers salaries funding transfer to national budget
- ☐ Redistribute freed funds to workers and specialists (KF07-KF18: 95% of staff)
- ☐ Consider bringing in experienced high-level managers from Europe



Bonus Scheme Issues:

Schemes exist but not coordinated with worker representatives (TU)

Indicators unrealistic - up to 40-50% of dismantling fitters position remaining unfilled cause employees overload

Result: *demotivation, burnout, resignations*

Proposal: Consider and recognize the motivational allowance as part of the salary system

5. Parallel Projects: DGR & SMRs & INPP Decommissioning



- ❑ *Employees even now don't understand why [Altra] – there is no real benefit for employees*
- ❑ Deep Geological Repository – very important project to finalize RAW treatment
- ❑ Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) project unrelated to decommissioning
 - Competence requirements for new staff lowered (The focus is on Vilnius)
 - New positions with high salaries cause confusion and demotivation
 - Management prioritizes SMR due to easier funding



It is important to stress that the TU is not against the nuclear future or SMRs. However, we recognize that the current workforce will not be employed at new facilities due to natural retirement processes and the transition to different technologies

There is a real threat to projects financed under the Ignalina Program — easier access to state funds for DGR and SMR **leads to reduced attention to specialists and workers engaged in Ignalina Program activities**

Proposal: Recommend to Lithuanian government to separate the other big projects from SE Ignalina NPP



Thank You for the opportunity to be heard,
with hope for real changes!

